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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The parties to this proceeding are: 
1. Jessica Hawkins, a minor; 
2. Brian and Melinda Hawkins, as guardians of Jessica Hawkins, a minor; and, 
3. Blair Peart, dba Navajo Trails 
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May 26, 2000. Piumtiff filed a Notice oi \ppeal on June 19, 2000. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Issue: Did the trial court err in determining the Release Form violated public policy? 
Citation to Record to Preserve Issue on Appeal: Appellant's Addendum ("Aplt. 
Add.") p. 000043. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews all legal conclusions de novo, reviewing the 
trial court's ruling for correctness without deferring to its legal conclusions. Bonham 
v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
II Issue: Did the trial court err in giving effect to the indemnification clause within the 
Release Form rather than declaring it unenforceable? 
Citation to Record to Preserve Issue on Appeal: Aplt. Add., p. 000043. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews all legal conclusions de novo, reviewing the 
trial court's ruling for correctness without deferring to its legal conclusions. Bonham 
v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PRO VISIONS.
 3 x HI t AJLJ. ORDINANCES. RULES AND 
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE 
APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Appellant is not aware of any controlling statutes or case :;i\\ that dispose of the issue 
before iiiv. i o.iii n . . ,^^ , ;,, iollowing statutes are relevant to the issues on appeal: 
1. U.C.A. §15-2-2 
2. U.C.A. §75-5-103 
3. U.C.A. §75-5-209 
4 . TT.C A ' t " ^ - 1 ' c-
5. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 17,1997, Jessica Hawkins ("Jessica") went horseback riding using horses and 
guides provided by Defendant Blair Peart, dba Navajo Trails ("Navajo Trails"). At the time, 
she was 11 years old. Before beginning the trail ride, Jessica's mother, Melinda, signed a 
document (the "Release Form") which stated that, acting on behalf of Jessica, Melinda 
Hawkins released Navajo Trails from any claims for injury, loss or damage incurred by 
Jessica as a result of Navajo Trails' acts, other than for gross negligence or willful 
misconduct. In the Release Form, Melinda also agreed to indemnify Navajo Trails for any 
damages paid to Jessica as a result of injury to her. 
While on the trail ride, Jessica's horse was spooked and bolted from the group. The 
two 15 year old trail guides assigned to the group by Navajo Trails failed to stop or control 
Jessica's horse. After galloping away, the horse threw Jessica and she incurred serious 
injuries including a blowout fracture of her cheekbone, a fractured nose and significant facial 
lacerations. These injuries resulted in medical expenses exceeding $10,000. Jessica's 
recovery was complicated by hypertrophic scarring and she has significant permanent facial 
scarring. 
The district court ruled that, while the release language in the Release Form was void 
as against public policy, the indemnification language in the Release Form was enforceable. 
As a result, this appeal and cross appeal are before this Court. Jessica appeals the district 
court's determination that the indemnification language in the Release Form signed by 
4 
Melinda Hawkins is enforceable; Navajo Trails appeals the district court's determination that 
the release language in the Release Form i- not. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court erred in making inconsistent rulings regarding the Release Form. 
Both the release language and the indemnification language are unenforceable. The release 
language is unenforceable because a parent's release of a minor's rights to pursue a cause of 
action is against public policy in the State of Utah. Once that determination is made, it must 
follow that the indemnification language is likewise void. While the indemnification does 
not involve the problem of substituting a parent's consent for that of a minor, it 
impermissably pits the economic interests of the children against the parent in a way that 
endangers the child's interests. It is simply an attempt to accomplish by another avenue the 
same result sought by the release language: insulation of a tortfeasor from responsibility for 
his negligent actions. This Court should rule that both the release and the indemnification 
provisions of the Release Form are invalid. 
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STATEMENT OF I l l F 4..C I S . 
1." On Jul) 18, 1997, Jessica was in Duck Creek, Utah, with her famih ^ i a iuinily 
reunion. Jessica went on a horseback ride using horses and guides provided by 
Nav ajo ' I i ails, a trail t iding business ,n ;;- , • ,,,- i ICLR area. At the IHIK Jessica was 
2. The Hawkins family told Navajo Trails both at the time they made the reservnt i< mi and 
at the time they arrived, that the group w ould be equally split between children and 
adults. Ihe> informed Navajo Trails that there would be a total o f ] 8 individuals in 
tl leh gi < i i] \ i )11 idle 1 „{ » 00002 4 , "1 1 
3. Nav ajo I 'rails assi ired Jessica's i i lotl ler " 
riding mild mannered trail horses and that, in light of the mild nature of the horses, 
• even children as young as 3 \eurN old could ride alone. Aplt. Add., p. 000024, ^ [5. 
4. Jessica had i it lie experience riding horses, and her mother relied oi I the 
represenl.ilions ml i\hi\jfu IIMIIS ilui llie horses were calm, gentle, and easy to 
control. \| ll \J t l I "DOOM 1|S. 
5. The Hawkins family reserved a total of 14 horses, with the 4 youngest children riding 
with their parents. Aplt Add. p 000024, <|6 
6. A 11 of tl le conversations on Jul} :,n. via; wi the ride, were with the teenage 
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7. When the Hawkins family arrived at the stable to begin the trail ride, Jessica's mother 
was told to sign a document entitled "Release Form." She was told that there must 
be one form filled out for every adult, and that each adult needed to add his or her 
child's name(s) on the form. Aplt Add., p. 000024, [^8. 
8. In pertinent part, the Release Form stated: 
Riding and handling horses can be dangerous... By signing this 
form you agree to assume the risk of any injury, death, or loss, 
or damage which you or your child . . . may suffer. 
In consideration . . . of trail riding . . . service[s] . . [t]he 
undersigned on behalf of himself or for any person for whom he 
or she is a parent... does hereby indemnify (reimburse), release 
and forever hold harmless, Navajo Trails and Outfitters . . . of 
any claims . . . or causes of actions on account of. . . injury or 
loss or damage which may occur from any cause, without regard 
to negligence, other than . . . gross negligence or willful 
misconduct. . . during the presence of the undersigned or . . . 
her child . . . at Navajo Trails and Outfitters. If the undersigned 
is a parent... he or she further agrees to indemnify (reimburse) 
Navajo Trails . . . for any damages paid by or assessed against 
Navajo Trails . . . as a result of injury . . . of a child. 
Aplt. Add., p. 000028. 
9. Jessica's mother filled out the Release Form for herself but did not list any of her 
children on the form. She intentionally omitted the names of her children because she 
did not want the language of the Release Form to cover any of them. Aplt. Add., p. 
000024, f 8. 
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10. Defei idai it • i id i: lot qi lestion J essica's mother about the fact that none oi her children 
were listed on the Release Form. Aplt. Add., p. 000024, ^ 9. 
11 Original!)' , three teenagers were scheduled to go w ith the Hawkins family as gt lides. 
However nttlK U»M n.imite, only two guides were sent with the group. ! aU". . me 
HHing IIIUI appealed In In ill iinl lo \i\ir» nit I < hii nl liu ill iunli nil (In 11 oil I I the 
groi ip ai id the other at tl: le i ear, ( vitl: I the I law kins family riding horses in between 
them. Jessica rode her own horse. Aplt. Add., p. 000025, *[|s 10, 11. 
12 Tessica\ mother became concerned on the trail ride that the guides did nol \\\o\\ 
exactly where to ttiKe the group. One of the guides later to.u Jc-wcu n \ aie; ; ,.e 
: t 
13. As the group came up to a road and prepared to cross it, Jessica's horse suddenly 
bolted onto the road Two Suburbans traveling on the road spooked Jessica's horse 
and she began to lose control ol luni. Apll Add , p 0(HHL!\ |^ 13, 
a chanc : .. ,.ami die horse down and maintain control of the situation. However, 
there was only one guide with the group. The other guide was still follow ing the rest 
of the group as it approached the road. The guide with Jessica's group did not appear 
confident about how to deal with the situation, anc :..., - : .ooicing u 
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from his co-worker, Jessica's horse bolted away from the group. After galloping 
away, the horse threw Jessica. Aplt. Add., p. 000025, ^ |sl4, 15. 
15. Following attempts to deal with her injuries at the scene, Jessica was eventually 
transported to St. George, where she was treated in the emergency room for her 
injuries, including a fractured nose and cheek, and significant facial lacerations. Aplt. 
Add., pp. 000025-000026, Js 16, 17. 
16. Jessica suffered hypertrophic scarring as result of the facial lacerations and continues 
to have significant scarring as a result of the fall and her injuries. Jessica has medical 
expenses exceeding $10,000.00. Aplt. Add., p. 000026,1J18. 
17. In March, 1998, Jessica, through her parents, brought this lawsuit against Blair Peart, 
dba Navajo Trails, claiming negligence by the defendant and requesting compensation 
for her injuries. Plaintiffs' Complaint, Aplt. Add. at pp. 000001-000005. 
18. If Navajo Trails is allowed to obtain indemnification from Jessica's mother for any 
amounts Navajo Trails pays for Jessica's injuries, Jessica's mother has asked Jessica 
and her father not to pursue any claims against Navajo Trails. Aplt. Add., p. 000026, 
119. 
19. The trial court concluded that a parent's release of a third party's liability to a child 
for negligence violates public policy and is unenforceable. Aplt. Add. at pp. 000036, 
000042. 
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irial court also concluded that Navajo Trails" indemnification clause within the 
Release Form did not violate public policy and is enforceable, ihc ctlect of the 
Vulemnification clause is that Navajo Trails would be able to obtain reimbursement 
froi t 1IV I e l h ida I lawkii is, Jessica' s i r lother, foi any damages paid by or assessed against 
Na vajo ' I i alls as a resi ill: of Jessica's in ji u k s S pit '""i (id at p. 00004 3 
21. On May 26, 2000, notice of the signed order was filed in district court. On June 19, 
2000, Jessica filed a notice of appeal. On June 29, 2000, Navajo Trails filed a notice 
of cross appeal, Aplt Add., pp.000044^000047. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED IN PART PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. GIVING EFFECT TO 
THE INDEMNIFICATION LANGUAGE WITHIN THE RELEASE FORM 
RATHER THAN DECLARING IT UNENFORCEABLE 
A The Trial Court Erred In Making Inconsistent Rulings On The Enforceability 
Of The Release Language And The Indemnification Language 
The Release Form contains language in which Melinda Hawkins, acting on behalf of 
Jessica, both releases Navajo Trails from liability for any injuries Jessica may incur, and, on 
her own behalf, indemnifies Navajo Trails for any damages it may be required to pay out to 
Jessica in the event of injury to her. At times, the Release Form contains reference to the 
indemnification and the release in the same sentence. Despite this, the district court struck 
down the release language and upheld the indemnification language in the Release Form. 
The basis for the district court's distinction was that while the release provisions was entered 
into on behalf of a minor child, the indemnification language of the Release Form was 
between two competent adults. 
The district court's ruling on the indemnification language circumvents the important 
public policy considerations it followed when it invalidated the release provisions. 
Upholding the indemnification provision also creates a conflict of interest between Jessica 
and her mother, Melinda Hawkins. Public policy considerations require that both the release 
and the indemnification language in the Release Form be invalidated. 
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B. The Navajo Trails Release Language Violated Public Policy And Is 
Unenforceable Because Melinda Hawkins Should Not Be Allowed To Waive 
The Rights Of Jessica. A Minor Child 
Utah courts have not reached the issue of whether exculpatory provisions signed by 
a parent on behalf of a minor are enforceable. While exculpatory agreements may be 
enforceable between two adults if the language is clear and unequivocal, Russ v. Woodside 
Homes. Inc., 905 P.2d 901 (Ut. App. 1995), exculpatory clauses are not favored under the 
law. Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1887, 1889 (Utah 1983). 
Consequently, they are to be strictly construed against the indemnitee, Navajo Trails. Id. 
Release and indemnity provisions may be invalidated as violating public policy where they 
result from duress, deception, disparity of bargaining power or negotiations conducted at less 
than arm's length. Id. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that release and indemnification agreements 
are unenforceable as against public policy when they involve the rights of minor children. 
Representative of the cases is Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort. 834 P.2d 6 (Wash. 
1992). In Scott, the Washington Supreme Court, en banc, struck down an attempt to enforce 
a parent's pre-injury release of a tortfeasor's liability for injury to a minor child. The Court 
unanimously decided that its discussion about a parent's release of a child's rights was a very 
different question than whether release clauses between two adults were enforceable. Scott, 
834P.2dat l l . 
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The same Justice that authored Scott had written another opinion four years earlier 
comprehensively analyzing the factors to consider when evaluating whether release 
provisions in other contexts were enforceable. Wagenblast v. Odessa School District 105-
157-166J, 758 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1988). In turn, Wagenblast relied heavily on Tunkl v. 
Regents of Univ. of Cal 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963) in establishing six factors to consider 
when determining whether to enforce pre-injury release provisions. However, in Scott, the 
Washington court, while citing to Wagenblast, did not go through the process of analyzing 
the six factors. Rather, the Court concluded that the public policy in protecting children was 
sufficient, by itself, to mandate invalidation of the release agreement. Scott, 834 P.2d at 11-
12. 
Scott noted that Washington statutes require judicial approval for the settlements paid 
to minors, indicating that state's public policy of protecting minors from improper release 
of personal injury claims. Scott, 834 P.2d at 11. Like Washington, Utah has statutes in place 
to provide procedural and substantive protection for minors when their legal rights are at 
stake. For example, U.C.A. §§75-5-101 through211 detail the procedures that apply when 
a guardian is appointed to represent a minor's interests. Utah's district courts retain 
jurisdiction in some cases to supervise disbursements from a minor's trust, require a trustee 
of the minor's settlement proceeds to file a bond, etc. IcL Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 17(b) and (c), together with U.C.A. §78-11-6, deal with procedures for bringing or 
defending a suit by or against a minor. 
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In addition, children are entitled to a wide array of statutory protections from tolling 
of statutes of limitations, U.C.A. §78-12-20, to establishing a separate juvenile court system, 
U.C.A. §78-3a, et. seq., to giving minors the right to repudiate contracts they make before 
the age of majority, U.C.A. §15-2-2. In fact, the State "holds a compelling interest in the 
safety and welfare of the children within its jurisdiction." J.B. v. Washington County, 905 
F.Supp. 979, 986 (D. Utah 1995). Minors necessitate court intervention to protect them 
" . . . from being taken advantage of by designing persons . . . It is the responsibility of our 
courts to so safeguard [minors'] rights until they have attained their majority and thus 
presumably have the maturity of judgment necessary to deal with opposing parties on equal 
terms, so that it is fair and equitable to bind them by their acts." Harvey v. Hadfield 372 
P.2d 985,986 (Utah 1965). The court should nullify the release and indemnification clauses 
because they impermissably interfere with the fundamental rights of a minor to seek 
compensation from a tortfeasor. 
Other states' courts are no less direct than Scott in their refusal to enforce such 
releases. See, e.g., Meyer v. Naperville Manor, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 411,414 (111. App. 2 Dist. 
1994)("It is now the general rule that, in the absence of statutory or judicial authorization, 
a parent cannot waive, compromise or release a minor child's cause of action merely because 
of the parental relationship."); Munozv.I.I. Jaz.Inc. 863 S.W. 2d 207,209-210 (Tex. App. 
1993)(holding that state statute giving parents power to make decisions of substantial legal 
significance for their child did not give them the power to waive a child's cause of action for 
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personal injuries); Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 6-8 (Tenn.App. 
1989)(attempt by parent to execute release for negligence is void); and Fitzgerald v. Newark 
Morning Ledger Co,, 267 A.2d 557, 558 (N.J. 1970) ("A parent has no authority unless he 
has been appointed guardian to compromise or release claims or causes of action belonging 
to the child"). See also Fedor v. Mauwehu Council Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 143 A.2d 
466 (Conn.Super. 1958) (invalidating release) and Doyle v. Boudoin College, 403 A.2d 
1206, fn. 3 (Me.App. 1979) (invalidating release). While there is a split of authority on the 
issue, the logic of Scott and the cases from other jurisdictions cited above is sound and 
should be adopted in Utah. The public policy of protecting Utah's children is sufficiently 
important, without more, to justify invalidation of the release provisions in the Release Form. 
Alternatively, the analytic framework initially set forth in Tunkl by the California 
Supreme Court and adopted by Washington in Wagenblast is likewise sound and weighs 
against upholding the release provisions. In Tunkl, the California Supreme Court considered 
whether a release imposed as a condition for admission to a charitable research hospital was 
valid. After being treated, Hugo Tunkl brought an action for personal injuries and challenged 
the release provision as being violative of public policy. In attempting to define what 
constitutes the "public interest," the court noted: 
If, then, the exculpatory clause which affects the public interest cannot 
stand, we must ascertain those factors or characteristics which 
constitute the public interest. The social forces that have led to such 
characterization are volatile and dynamic. No definition of the concept 
of public interest can be contained within the four corners of a formula. 
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The concept, always the subject of great debate, has ranged over the 
whole course of the common law; rather than attempt to prescribe its 
nature, we can only designate the situations in which it has been 
applied. We can determine whether the instant contract does or does 
not manifest the characteristics which have been held to stamp a 
contract as one affected with the public interest. 
Xunkl,383P.2dat444. 
The court then identified six separate factors to consider in determining if a contract 
containing an exculpatory clause affected the public interest. The court determined that such 
a transaction exhibits some or all of the following characteristics: 
It concerns a business of the type generally thought suitable for public 
regulation The party seeking exculpation is engaged in 
performing a service of great importance to the public, . . . . which is 
often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public.. 
. . . The party holds himself out as willing to perform this service for 
any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member 
coming within certain established standards As a result of the 
essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the 
transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive 
advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who 
seeks his services In exercising a superior bargaining power, the 
party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract of 
exculpation, . . . . and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may 
pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence. 
Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the 
purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, . . . . subject to the 
risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents, (footnotes with citations 
omitted) 
Tunkl, 383P.2dat445. 
Applying these factors to this case, most, if not all, of the six factors clearly weigh 
against enforcement of the release provisions. First, the Release Form concerns an endeavor 
17 
of a type thought suitable for public regulation. While Navajo Trails is a private company, 
not subject to public regulation, and Jessica is not aware of statutes or regulations specifically 
applicable to horseback riding companies that regulate Navajo Trails' behavior, that is not 
the entire scope of the issue in this case. The specific question for this Court is whether 
Navajo Trails may enforce a release it has obtained on behalf of a minor child. As noted 
above, the circumstances under which businesses may obtain a waiver of a minor's legal 
rights, is subject to extensive regulation and scrutiny by the State of Utah. This factor clearly 
weighs against enforcement of the release provision. 
As for the second factor, whether Navajo Trails is engaged in performing a service 
of significant public importance, or which concerns necessary services for at least some 
members of the public, it does not appear that horseback vidingper se falls into this category. 
However, once again, as noted above, when providing services to children in the State of 
Utah, it is of great importance that businesses deal fairly with minors in negotiating to 
provide their services. Once an agreement has been made, it is likewise of great concern to 
the State of Utah that its minor children be provided an adequate method of redress if they 
are injured through the negligence of the company providing the services. Consequently, 
when viewed in the context of the facts of this case, this factor likewise suggests that the 
release provisions should be invalidated. 
As for the third factor, Navajo Trails held itself out as willing to provide its trail guide 
services for any member of the public. Indeed, the undisputed facts show that Melinda 
18 
Hawkins questioned whether the ride was appropriate for her own children and other children 
in the group. Navajo Trails reassured Jessica's mother that children as young as three years 
old could ride the horses safely and that the horses were mild mannered. Partly on the basis 
of this reassurance by Navajo Trails employees, Melinda Hawkins went ahead and signed 
the Release Form. This factor likewise weighs in favor of invalidating the release provisions. 
The fourth factor is whether, as a result of the essential nature of Navajo Trails' 
services and the economic setting of the transaction, it possessed a decisive advantage and 
bargaining position against Jessica. While it could be argued by Navajo Trails that Melinda 
Hawkins signed on behalf of her daughter completely voluntarily and was free to go 
elsewhere for trail guide services, the setting of the transaction is important to take into 
account. The group of eighteen individuals associated with the Hawkins family had reserved 
the trail guide services before arriving at Duck Creek. This group of eighteen people, in a 
rural location at least 30 miles from Cedar City, the nearest town of any size, were not 
informed that they would be required to sign the Release Form until immediately before the 
ride began. They were not in a good position to choose to do anything other than sign the 
Release Form. Under the facts and circumstances in their totality, Navajo Trails was in a 
position of significant advantage when it presented a Release to Melinda Hawkins to sign, 
both on her own behalf and on Jessica's. 
The fifth factor is whether Navajo Trails presented Jessica or Melinda Hawkins with 
a standardized adhesion contract releasing it and providing no option for Melinda to pay 
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additional amounts to cover the risk of Navajo Trails' exposure, should it be required to pay 
damages for injury to Jessica. Once again, this clearly weighs against enforcement of the 
release provisions. The Release Form was presented to Melinda Hawkins for signing 
immediately before the ride began. It was prepared by Navajo Trails. Melinda was not told 
it was optional nor was she given the ability to negotiate any terms other than what the form 
provided. Her choices were to either fill out and sign the document or not go on the trail 
ride. It was simply offered to her on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
Finally, as to the sixth factor, whether Jessica was placed under the control of Navajo 
Trails, and subject to the risk of negligence by it, there can be little question that this was true 
to an overwhelming extent for Jessica. As a minor child with very little experience riding 
horses, she was at the mercy of Navajo Trails and its employees. 
The Tunkl court noted that satisfying each of the six elements was unnecessary to 
determine that an exculpatory provision violated public policy. Under the circumstances of 
this case, all six weigh, to varying degrees, in favor of invalidating the release language. For 
all, little argument can be made in favor of validating the release provisions. Whether this 
Court adopts the more definitive approach of the Washington Supreme Court in Scott and 
other jurisdictions cited herein, or the Tunkl factors, there can be little question that the 
release language fails to pass muster under public policy in the State of Utah.1 
1
 There is an advantage in definitively stating that release provisions dealing with 
minor childrens' rights are void as a matter of law: such a rule of law provides clear 
guidance to people doing business within the State of Utah. Even if this Court adopts the 
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C If The Release Provisions Are Unenforceable, The Indemnification Language 
Should Likewise Be Struck Down As Violating Public Policy Of The State Of 
Utah 
If this Court determines the release provisions of the Release Form are invalid based 
on public policy concerns, it makes no sense to uphold the indemnification language of the 
Release Form. The district court decided that the release language was unenforceable and 
against public policy and yet held that the indemnification provisions were enforceable. It 
is difficult to understand the district court's logic behind the different interpretations of the 
exculpatory language in the Release Form. Release and indemnification clauses and their 
effects go hand in hand. In this case, the purpose for both provisions in the Release Form 
was to protect Navajo Trails from any economic loss associated with its negligent acts and 
shift the burden of loss to either Jessica or her mother. 
Several courts have invalidated attempts by tortfeasors to have innocent parties 
indemnify the tortfeasor for any payments made to the minor child. The following cases 
interpret language that is directly on point with the language at issue in this case, in that they 
contain both release and indemnification language: Childress, supra: Fitzgerald, supra: and 
Ohio Casualty Insurance Company v. Mallison, 354 P.2d 800 (Ore. 1960). The district 
court's ruling in this case is unprecedented: Jessica's counsel has found no case invalidating 
Tunkl factors to evaluate the legitimacy of release provisions in other contexts, those 
factors justify a bright-line test invalidating release provisions as applied to minors 
because so many of those factors implicate Utah's public policy in protecting the rights of 
minors, their personal safety and their right to redress when injured through the fault of 
others. 
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release provisions on public policy grounds while at the same time upholding the 
enforceability of indemnification provisions. 
Courts have ruled that indemnification provisions drive a wedge between parents or 
guardians and their children or wards. Typical of these concerns are the comments of the 
Oregon Supreme Court in Mallison: 
As parent-guardian he owes a duty to act for the benefit of his child. That duty 
is not fully discharged where the parent enters into a bargain which gives rise 
to conflicting interests — There is a real danger that the child's interests will 
be put in jeopardy because of the parent's concern over his or her own 
economic interests... Looking at the matter from the standpoint of the child's, 
rather than the parent's, choice of action (if the child had the capacity to make 
a choice) again we find policy considerations which are important. A child, 
realizing that his recovery from the defendant would ultimately call for the 
parent to indemnify the defendant, would not be likely to pursue his rights. 
Mallison, 354 P.2d at 803. 
Even though the district court found the release language to be unenforceable, Jessica 
is denied any remedies if the indemnification language is valid. She is not likely to seek 
damages against Navajo Trails for her injuries, which in turn would be indemnified by her 
mother. The undisputed facts verify that Melinda Hawkins has asked her husband, Jessica's 
father, not to pursue this action if to do so would result in Melinda indemnifying Navajo 
Trails. The conflict of interest, apparent at the time the Release Form was signed, has come 
to fruition in this case. Even though the conflict of interest was only potential at the time the 
Release Form was signed, it is now real. As such, the indemnification provisions are not 
enforceable. Loesch. to Use of Harlevsville Mutual Cas. Co. v. Vassiliades, 86 A.2d 14 
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(N.J.Super 1952). Jessica's interests are not furthered in any way by invalidating the release 
terms of the Release Form unless the indemnification terms are also invalidated. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court must reverse the district court's order of granting in part Defendant's 
motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set above, the district court erred in not 
holding that both the release and indemnification provisions were unenforceable and against 
public policy. This court must, therefore, uphold the district court's ruling that the release 
provisions are unenforceable and against public policy. This court must also hold that the 
indemnification language is also unenforceable and against public policy. 
DATED this J T day of September, 2000. 
KING & ISAACSON, P.C 
Brian S. King / 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Jessica Hawkins 
4 Triad Center, Suite 825 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
Telephone: (801)532-1700 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JESSICA HAWKINS through 
her guardians, Brian and 
Melinda Hawkins, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BLAIR PEART, dba 
NAVAJO TRAILS, 
C O M P L A I N T 
Civil No. QfyPhPfW/'? 
Judge fftvivifi. 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff, Jessica Hawkins, by and through her guardians, Brian and Melinda Hawkins 
("Hawkins"), by and through her undersigned counsel, complains and alleges as follows: 
1. Jessica Hawkins is a natural person residing in the State of California. 
2. Defendant Blair Peart is doing business in Kane, Iron and Washington Counties as 
Navajo Trails ("Navajo Trails"). 
3. The accident which is the subject matter of this Complaint occurred in Kane 
County, State of Utah. 
onor^ 
4. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-3-4, and venue 
is appropriate in this Court pursuant to U.C.A. §78-13-7. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
5. Hawkins realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 4. 
6. On July 18, 1997 Hawkins, eleven years old at the time, was on a vacation with 
her parents and other family members in the Cedar City area. 
7. As part of the activities of the family vacation, the group with which Hawkins was 
vacationing contacted Navajo Trails to arrange for trail rides at Duck Creek. 
8. Navajo Trails is in the business of providing trail rides for hire to residents and 
visitors to the area. 
9. On July 18, 1997, the group of which Jessica was a part contracted with Navajo 
Trails to have it take the group on a ride for approximately an hour in the evening. 
10. Navajo Trails represented to the Hawkins group that the horses used by Navajo 
Trails were gentle and appropriate for any child over the age of three to ride. 
11. Navajo Trails also represented that its employees and guides were experienced and 
competent to take the group on a trail ride. 
12. Navajo Trails provided two trail guides for the group. 
13. Individuals in the Hawkins group told Navajo Trails' employees that only one of 
the 18 individuals in the Hawkins group had significant experience riding horses and that the 
group would be relying upon the experience and expertise of the Navajo Trails' guides. 
14. During the ride with the group, Hawkins' horse bolted from the group and ran 
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away. 
15. In the process, Hawkins was thrown to the ground and incurred severe injuries, 
including a blowout fracture of the right orbital facial bones, fractured nasal passages, and 
significant facial lacerations. 
16. Surgery was necessary to repair the injuries of Hawkins and she has been left with 
significant permanent facial scarring. 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
17. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 
through 16 above. 
18. In conducting its business activities, Navajo Trails had a duty to provide safe and 
competent riding conditions for the public generally and the Hawkins group specifically. 
19. Navajo Trails violated its duty to Hawkins in the following specific ways: 
(a) Navajo Trails failed to provide competent, experienced guides to the Hawkins 
group; 
(b) Navajo Trails failed to provide horses that were trained and predisposed to be 
appropriate to carry individuals with little or no riding skills such as Hawkins and others in the 
Hawkins group. 
(c) Navajo Trails failed to provide a sufficient number of guides for the individuals in 
the Hawkins group. 
(d) The Navajo Trails' guides accompanying the Hawkins group failed to properly 
carry out their duties and responsibilities regarding controlling the horses, taking an appropriate 
route for the group, and responding to the actions of the horse Hawkins was riding before it 
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become unmanageable. 
20. The actions and failures to act of Navajo Trails as outlined above are both the 
cause in fact and proximate cause of the injuries Hawkins has incurred. 
21. As a result of the breach of the duties owed Hawkins by Navajo Trails, Hawkins 
sustained significant and permanent physical injuries, including but not limited to a blowout 
fracture of the right orbital bones, fractured nose, and facial lacerations, including significant 
permanent scarring. 
22. In addition, Hawkins has incurred medical expenses exceeding $10,000, 
prospective future medical expenses, and has incurred and will continue to incur significant pain 
and suffering, stress, mental and emotional pain and anguish, and other general damages. 
23. Hawkins is entitled to be compensated for her injuries in an amount to be 
determined at trial of this matter in the form of payment for past and future medical expenses, 
property damage, and an award of general damages for pain and suffering and to compensate 
Hawkins for the permanent disfiguring effects of her injuries. 
WHEREFORE, Hawkins prays for judgment against defendant on her cause of action for 
an award of damages in an amount to be determined by the court for past and future medical 
expenses, property damages and general damages for her pain and suffering, mental and emotional 
anguish, both past and future, and for such further relief as the court deems proper. 
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DATED this J±_ day of March, 1998. 
KING & ISAACSON 
/ ^ _ ?• 0 
Brian S. King 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Plaintiff's Address: 
16 CalaD'or 
Laguna Niguel, CA 92677 
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II. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(Exhibit B excluded) 
BrianS. King (#4610) 
Marcie E. Schaap (#4660) 
KING & ISAACSON, P.C. 
4 Triad Center, Suite 825 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Telephone: (801) 532-1700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JESSICA HAWKINS through 
her guardians, Brian and 
Melinda Hawkins, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BLAIR PEART, dba 
NAVAJO TRAILS, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 980600017 
Judge David L. Mower 
Plaintiff, Jessica Hawkins ("Hawkins") through her undersigned counsel, submits the 
following Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment pursuant to 4-501 of 
the Rules of Judicial Administration for the District Courts of the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. On July 17, 1997, Hawkins was in Duck Creek, Utah with her family for a family 
reunion. On the day, Hawkins went on a horseback ride using horses and guides provided by 
Defendant Blair Peart, dba Navajo Trails ("Navajo Trails"), a trail riding business in the Duck Creek 
area. Affidavit of Melinda Hawkins. f3. 
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2. Navajo Trails assured Heather's mother that all of the adults and children would be 
riding mild mannered trail horses and that in light of the mild nature of the horses, even children as 
young as 3 years old could ride alone. Aff. of Melinda Hawkins, 1[5. 
3. Hawkins had little experience riding horses and relied on the representations of the 
Navajo Trails guides that the horses were calm, gentle, and easy to control. Aff. of Melinda 
Hawkins, ^5. 
4. When Hawkins' family arrived at the stable to begin the trail ride, Hawkins' mother 
was told to fill out a release form for the ride. She was told there needed to be one form filled out 
for every adult, and that each adult needed to add his or her child's name(s) on the form. Hawkins' 
mother filled out the release for herself but did not include any of her children on the form. She 
intentionally omitted the names of her children because she did not want the language of the release 
to cover any of them. Aff. of Melinda Hawkins, Tf8. 
5. Hawkins' mother was not questioned about the fact that none of her children were 
listed on the form. Aff of Melinda Hawkins, *|9. 
6. The Navajo Trails guides were young and had never been on the particular trail they 
were riding on with a group before. Aff. of Melinda Hawkins, ^12. 
7. While on the trail ride, Hawkins' horse was spooked and bolted away from the group. 
After galloping away, the horse threw Hawkins. Aff. of Melinda Hawkins, [^13-15. 
8. Hawkins incurred serious inj uries including a fractured nose and cheek and significant 
facial lacerations. Aff. of Melinda Hawkins, If 15-18. 
9. Hawkins is left with permanent facial scarring as a result of the accident and has 
medical expenses exceeding $10,000.00. Aff. of Melinda Hawkins, 1118. 
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10. In March, 1998, Hawkins, through her parents, brought this lawsuit against Blair 
Peart, dba Navajo Trails, claiming negligence by the defendant and requesting compensation for her 
injuries. 
11. If Navajo Trails is allowed to obtain indemnification from Hawkins' mother for any 
amounts Navajo Trails pays for Hawkins' injuries, Hawkins' mother has asked Hawkins and her 
father not to pursue any claims against Navajo Trails. Aff. of Melinda Hawkins, 1[ 19. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented to the court involve the interpretation of language in a document 
signed by Hawkins' mother, Melinda Hawkins. There are no genuine issues as to any material 
facts relating to the document and it can be interpreted and ruled on as a matter of law. Russ v. 
Woodside Homes. Inc.. 905 P.2d 901 (Utah.App. 1995) 
ARGUMENT 
This Motion for Partial Summary Judgment deals with the validity and enforcement of 
exculpatory contractual provisions that are sought to be applied to and enforced against the rights 
of a minor child to seek compensation for personal injuries based on the negligence of Navajo 
Trails. First, Hawkins claims that the terms of the release do not apply to any claim brought by 
her, or to any compensation received by her. Second, to the extent that the release does apply to 
and bind Jessica Hawkins, it should be declared void and unenforceable because it is against the 
public policies of the State of Utah. 
/ / 
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A. The Exculpatory And Indemnity Provisions Of The Release Do Not 
Apply To Hawkins7 Claim Or To Amounts Received By Her As A Result 
Of Her Claim. 
Navajo Trails has raised two defenses that Hawkins seeks to dispose of in this motion. 
Both of the defenses arise out of the language of a document signed by Melinda Hawkins at the 
time the injury occurred. A copy of the release document ("the Release") is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. 
The Defendant claims the Release gives rise to two separate but related defenses. The 
first is that the language of the Release bars Hawkins from bringing any claims against Navajo 
Trails based on anything other than gross negligence or willful misconduct. The second defense 
is that the Release requires Melinda Hawkins to indemnify Navajo Trails for any amounts Navajo 
Trails may be required to pay to Melinda's daughter, Hawkins. 
Both of these defenses fail for the simple reason that, on its face, the Release is not broad 
enough to include Hawkins or her claims within its language. 
Utah law relating to agreements such as the one at issue in this case is summarized in the 
case ofRussv Woodside Homes. Inc., 905 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1995). In that case, the court of 
appeals stated that parties may shift financial responsibility for harm caused by their ordinary 
negligence " . .. only if the contract language clearly and unequivocally expresses the parties' 
intent to indemnify one another." Id. at 904. 
Historically, such agreements to release or indemnify a tortfeasor are " .. . not the 
favorites of the law." Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Sisnal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1887, 1189 
(Utah 1983). Consequently, they are strictly construed against the indemnitee. Id. In this case, 
that is Navajo Trails. Courts are suspicious of such releases and indemnity agreements. They 
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may be invalidated as violating public policy where they result from duress, deception, disparity 
of bargaining power or negotiations conducted at less than arm's length. Id, 
Fundamental to proving the existence of any contract, especially one disfavored, such as 
the Release, is the clear expression of intent by an individual that he or she agrees to be bound by 
the terms of the contract. It is axiomatic that there can be no enforceable contract on a subject 
matter not agreed to by the parties. Sackler v. Savin. 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah, 1995). 
Similarly, there can be no enforceable contract against individuals who have not manifest their 
assent to the terms of the contract. Id. 
In this particular case involving the Release, there is no action by Melinda Hawkins, 
Hawkins' mother, that indicates assent on her part, either individually or as agent for Hawkins, to 
include her daughter within the terms of the Release. This is made clear by two undisputed facts. 
The first is that the face of the contract itself does not include any reference to Hawkins. This is 
especially telling in light of the fact that there is space on the face of the agreement for the adult 
signing the Release to list any children that are taken on the trail ride. This blank space has no 
information in it to indicate that Melinda Hawkins intended to include any of her three children 
within the scope of the Release. 
Second, there is Melinda Hawkins' undisputed testimony that she had no intention at the 
time she signed the Release of adding her childrens' names to that document. Having received a 
signed Release for Melinda Hawkins only, Navajo Trails cannot now shoehorn Melinda's 
daughter into the document. 
Hawkins was obviously not a party to the agreement by her own assent. As a minor, 
Hawkins did not have capacity to enter into an enforceable contract. Swalberg v. Hannegan, 883 
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P.2d 931 (Utah App. 1994). The only way in which she could allegedly fall within the scope of 
the Release is by Melinda, as her mother, signing on her behalf and binding Hawkins to the terms 
of the Release because Melinda is Hawkins' parent. Hawkins disputes that even if she had been 
listed as an individual covered by the terms of the Release, this would have been enforceable 
against her. See sub-point B below. However, this is a point the court need not reach in light of 
the failure of the Release to identify Hawkins as being a party to it. 
B. To The Extent Navajo Trails Succeeds In Making The Release Applicable To 
Either Prevent A Claim Being Brought Bv Hawkins Or To Require 
Indemnification By Melinda For Any Amounts Paid To Hawkins, The Release Is 
Void As Against Public Policy. 
While Utah courts have not reached the issue of whether exculpatory provisions signed 
by a parent on behalf of a minor are enforceable, other courts deciding the issue have held that 
such release and indemnification agreements are unenforceable as violations of public policy. 
Representative of the cases is Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6 (Wash. 
1992). In Scott, the Washington Supreme Court, en banc, outlined a rule comparable to those in 
Utah regarding exculpatory clauses generally. The Court indicated that they would be strictly 
construed and, if clear in their scope, would be enforced. However, in Scott, the Court dealt with 
a parent's pre-injury release of a tortfeasor's liability for injury to a minor child. The Court 
discussed at length the public policy behind whether such a release by a parent on behalf of a 
child should be enforced. The Court unanimously decided that this would not be allowed. The 
child was free to pursue a claim for personal injury, despite his parent's purported release of 
liability on the child's behalf. 
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In Scott the Court noted that the requirement of judicial approval for settlements paid to 
minor's indicated the public policy of Washington to protect minors from release of personal 
injury claims. Id. at p. 11. Utah has the same requirement for personal injury settlements for a 
minor's claim. U.C.A. §75-5-101 through 211. 
Other states are no less direct in their refusal to enforce such releases. Meyer v. 
Naperville Manor. Inc.. 634 N.E.2d 411 (111. App. 2 Dist. 1994); Munoz v. I.I. Jaz. Inc.. 863 S.W. 
2d 207 (Tex. App. 1993). Several other courts extend this analysis to invalidate attempts by 
tortfeasors to have innocent parties indemnify the tortfeasor for any payments made to the minor 
child. The following cases interpret language that is directly on point with the language at issue 
in this case, in that they contain both release and indemnification language: Childress v. Madison 
County. 777 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. App. 1989); Fitzgerald v. Newark Morning Ledger Company. 267 
A.2d 557 (NJ. 1970); Ohio Casualty Insurance Company v. Mallison. 354 P.2d 800 (Ore. 1960). 
Copies of the cases from outside Utah on which Hawkins relies are attached as Exhibit "B". 
The basis for the ruling by courts specifically relating to the indemnity language is that to 
enforce such an agreement would drive a wedge between parents or guardians and their children 
or wards. As stated by the Oregon Supreme Court in Mallison: 
As parent-guardian he owes a duty to act for the benefit of his child. That duty is not 
fully discharged where the parent enters into a bargain which gives rise to conflicting 
interests.... There is a real danger that the child's interests will be put in jeopardy 
because of the parent's concern over his or her own economic interests . . . Looking at the 
matter from the standpoint of the child's, rather than the parent's, choice of action (if the 
child had the capacity to make a choice) again we find policy considerations which are 
important. A child, realizing that his recovery from the defendant would ultimately call 
for the parent to indemnify the defendant, would not be likely to pursue his rights. Ohio 
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Mallison. 354 P.2d at 803. 
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Under the circumstances, there can be little question that both the Release language and 
the indemnification language in the Release are unenforceable as being void against public policy 
in the State of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
The language of the Release is not broad enough to apply to claims brought by Hawkins. 
Even if it were, the Release is unenforceable as a violation of public policy within the State of 
Utah. All defenses Navajo Trails raises under the Release should be stricken. 
DATED this ^ day of April, 1999. 
Brian S. King 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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EXHIBIT 
A 
r> ^ \ ^  ** m 
Navajo Trails and Outfitters 
291 W 500 N 
La Verkin Utah 84745 
RELEASE FORM FOR THE RIDERS OF NAVAJO TRAILS AND OUTFITTERS 
AND SWAINS CREEK PINES LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION 
Riding and handling horses can be DANGEROUS. This form must be completed and 
signed before you can ride or work for the Navajo Trails and Outfitters/ Swains 
Creek Pines Lot Owners Association. By signing this form, you agree to ASSUME 
THE RISK of any injury, death, or loss, or damage which you or your child or ward 
may sufier.^)y)4\^ initial if you read this. 
N a m s .jksJ^JLUmlhlds^^. Ph0ne Mi..Z.lL?± 
Last First 
A * ^ JLk-CcJ*=-J5Lj£b:
 Ags _..!.<-/ 
City ' '' State Zip 
In consideration for the rendering of trail riding and or wagon riding service by 
Navajo Trails and Outfitters,/Swains Creek Pines Lot Owners Association. The 
undersigned on behalf of himself or for any person for whom he or she is a parent 
or legal gardian, does hereby indemnify (reimburse), release, and forever hold 
harmless, Navajo Trails and Outfitters,/Swains Creek Lot Owners Association, i t 's 
employees, officers, agents, patrons, students, invitees, contractors, horse owners 
and landlords acting officially or otherwise, of any claims, demands, and actions or 
causes of action on account of death or injury or loss or damage which may occur 
from any cause, without regard to negligence, other than the gross negligence or 
willful misconduct of Navajo Trails and Outfitters /Swains Creek Pines Lot Owners 
Association or such persons, during the presence of the undersigned or the 
presence of his or her child or ward at Navajo Trails and Outfitters / Swains Creek 
Pines Lot Owners Association or while the undersigned, or his or her child or ward, 
is in transit to or from Navajo Trails and Outfitters / Swains Creek Pines Lot 
Owners Association premises. If the undersigned is a parent or guardian, he or she 
further agrees to indemnify (reimburse) Navajo Trails and Outfitters and / or such 
persons for any damages paid by or assessed against Navajo Trails and Outfitters 
and / or such persons as a result of injury to or death of a .child or ward. 
i -./> 
Parent or Guardian for: 
Date LfJlpLL Signed t_Jf ld£/ l*d!aJta«£^ ,i2itiLj-k..^Ju 
III. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REPLY MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Brian S.King (#4610) 
Marcie E. Schaap (#4660) 
KING & ISAACSON, P.C. 
4 Triad Center, Suite 825 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Telephone: (801) 532-1700 
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IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JESSICA HAWKINS through 
her guardians, Brian and 
Melinda Hawkins, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BLAIR PEART, dba 
NAVAJO TRAILS, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 980600017 
Judge David L. Mower 
Plaintiff Jessica Hawkins ("Hawkins"), by and through her counsel of record, Brian King of 
King & Isaacson, P.C, hereby submits her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. 
Defendant has filed separate Memorandums in Opposition to Hawkins' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and in support of his own cross Motion for Summary Judgment. Consequently, 
Hawkins will initially set forth a Statement of Facts addressing her Motion for Partial Summary 
nnnnifi 
Judgment and then address the Statement of Undisputed Facts presented by Defendant in his cross 
motion for Summary Judgment. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS 
1. Hawkins agrees that the accident occurred on July 18,1997 rather than July 17,1997. 
The error in dates was inadvertent. 
2. The reference to "Heather" in paragraph 2 of the Statement of Facts in Hawkins' 
primary memorandum was in error. The reference should be to "Hawkins." 
3. Hawkins disputes paragraph 3 of Defendant's Statement of Disputed Facts. The 
wranglers did not know the trail very well since it was their first time on that particular trail. The 
owner has stated that the wranglers were not familiar with the trail. The new trail would have taken 
the group beyond the routine trail to the restaurant for dinner. Since it was the first weekend the 
wranglers had tried that particular trail, they did not seem to know where they were going. See 
Affidavit of Melinda Hawkins 1J12. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
4. With regard to paragraph 7 of Defendant's Statement of Additional Facts, Hawkins 
disputes that signing the release constitutes the sole or primary consideration for Defendant's 
services. Hawkins paid Defendant for his work. This was the primary consideration for Defendant's 
services. 
5. With regard to paragraph 10 of Defendant's Statement of Additional Facts, Hawkins 
disputes that McKeily Peart and Brett Weston were qualified to lead the trail ride. In August of 
1998, over a year after the accident occurred, Defendant stated that at the time of the response to the 
interrogatories these individuals were 16 years old. That means that at the time of the accident the 
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individuals were, at most, 15 years old. Hawkins disputes their competence and judgment. See 
Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of 
Documents, Interrogatory No. 2. 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS IN RESPONSE 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
6 Hawkins' mother did sign the release form for herself but did not include any of her 
children on the form She intentional 1^  omituM the n.imes \)( '^r ohildrm because^he lid nr t \ jjit 
the language of the release to cover any of them. See Affidavit of Melinda Hawkins Tf8. 
7. Defendant did not question Hawkins' mother about the fact that none of her children 
were listed on the form See A ffida\ it of Melinda I law ki ns 'fl2. 
8 While on the trail ride, Hawkins' horse was spooked and bolted away from the group. 
After galloping away, the horse threw Hawkins, See Affidavit of Melinda Hawkins 113-15. 
9. . Hawkins incurred serious inj uries including a fracti ired nose and cheek arid signi fie ant 
facial lacerations. See Affidavit of Melinda Hawkins 115-18. 
Ha vv kins Is left with permanent facial scarring as a result of the accident and has 
medical expenses exceeding $10,000.00. See Affidavit of Melinda Hawkins 118. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is onl> appropriate v • • hen the mo ( ing pai ty has shown that there is no 
genuine issues as to any material facts relating to the document and it can be interpreted and ruled 
as a matter of law. Russ v. Woodside Homes. Inc., 905 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1995). 
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ARGUMENT 
Hawkins' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment deal with the same issue: the validity and enforcement of exculpatory contractual 
provisions that are sought to be applied to and enforced against the rights of a minor child to seek 
compensation for personal injuries based on the negligence of Navajo Trails. The arguments 
presented by Hawkins in her Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
apply with equal force in response to the arguments presented by Defendant in his Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Hawkins incorporates by reference her Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment in response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. In 
addition, Hawkins has the following comments. 
Hawkins has no quarrel with many of the legal principles cited by Defendant in his 
Memorandum. However Defendant's brief never addresses the issue before the Court: the 
enforceability of an exculpatory provision when it js being pressed on a minor. In fact none of the 
cases cited by Defendant deal with the issue before the court. The cases cited by Hawkins in her 
principal brief, however, are directly on point in discussing and invalidating exculpatory clauses as 
applied to minors. See Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6 (Wash. 1992); Meyer v. 
Nanerville Manor. Inc.. 634 N.E.2d 411 (111. App. 2 Dist. 1994); Munoz v. LI. Jaz. Inc.. 863 S.W. 
2d 207 (Tex. App. 1993); Childress v. Madison County. 777 S.W. 2d 1 (Tenn. App. 1989); 
Fitzgerald v. Newark Morning Ledger Company 267 A.2d 557 (N.J. 19701: Ohio Casualty Insurance 
Comnanv v. Mallison. 354 P.2d 800 (Ore. 1960). Copies of the cases from outside Utah on which 
Hawkins relies are attached to Hawkins' principal brief as Exhibit "B". 
4 
OOOQ;!9 
Utah's public policy with respect to minors is reflected in statute and case law. Children are 
entitled to a wide array of statutory protections running from tolling of statutes of limitations, U.C. A. 
§78-12-20, to establishing a separate juvenile court system, U.C.A. §78-3aet. seq., to giving minors 
the right to repudiate contracts they make before the age of majority, U.C.A. §15-2-2. In fact, the 
State of Utah, "holds a compelling interest in the safety and welfare of the children within its 
jurisdiction" J.B. v. Washington County, 905 F.Supp. 979, 986 (D. Utah 1995). Minors necessitate 
court intervention to protect them ". .. from being taken advantage of by designing persons . . . It 
is the responsibility of our courts to so safeguard [minors'] rights until they have attained their 
majority and thus presumably have the maturity of judgment necessary to deal with opposing parties 
equal terms, so that it is fair and equitable to bind them by their acts." Harvey v. Hadfield 372 P.2d 
985 (Utah 1965). The court should nullify the release and indemnification clauses because they 
impermissably interfere with the fundamental rights of a minor to seek compensation from a 
tortfeasor. 
A final example of State protection provided to minors directly analogous to this case 
involves the procedures in place for a court to review and approve settlements of a minor's tort 
claim. These are found in Rule 17(b) and (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, U.C.A. §78-11-6 
and in the Probate Code, U.C.A. §75-5-201 through 212. In addition, Utah's district courts retain 
jurisdiction in some cases to supervise disbursements from the trust, require a trustee of the minor's 
settlement proceeds to file a bond, etc. Id. In short, the State bends over backwards to protect its 
children. If it is necessary for a guardian to be appointed and a court to approve the settlement and 
release of a tortfeasor after injury to a minor, no basis exists to afford less protection to a minor 
before the injury occurs. 
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CONCLUSION 
The enforcement of exculpatory contractual provisions against the rights of a minor child 
should be unenforceable as a violation of public policy within the State of Utah. All defenses raised 
by Navajo Trails under the Release should be stricken and should not be applied to nor enforced 
against Hawkins in seeking compensation for personal injuries based on the negligence of Navajo 
Trails. 
DATED this 25 day of May, 1999. 
KING & ISAACSON, P.C 
Brian S. King 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
t 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the document entitled 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was sent via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, 
to the following: 
James W. Jensen 
HIGBEE, MACFARLANE & JENSEN, P.C. 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, UT 84721 
DATED this 25 day of May, 1999. 
i h i n n ? ? 
IV. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MELINDA HAWKINS 
Brian S.King (#4610) 
Marcie E. Schaap (#4660) 
KING & ISAACSON, P.C. 
4 Triad Center, Suite 825 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Telephone: (801) 532-1700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JESSICA HAWKINS through : 
her guardians, Brian and : 
Melinda Hawkins, : 
: AFFIDAVIT OF MELINDA HAWKINS 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : Civil No. 980600017 
BLAIR PEART, dba : Judge David L. Mower 
NAVAJO TRAILS, : 
Defendant. : 
Being first duly sworn, the undersigned deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen years, am competent to provide this testimony, and have 
personal knowledge of the matters of which I testify. 
2. I am the mother of the plaintiff in this case, Jessica Hawkins. Jessica's date of birth 
is March 6, 1986. 
3. On July 17,1997,1 was in Duck Creek, Utah with my children for a family reunion. 
On that day, our family was scheduled to go horseback riding using horses and guides from Navajo 
Trails, a trail riding business in the Duck Creek area. 
nnnnvA 
4. Navajo Trails was told both at the time the reservation was made and at the time our 
group arrived, that the group would be equally split between children and adults. We informed 
Navajo Trail^  that there would be a total of 18 individuals in our group. 
5. The individuals at the stable assured me that all of the adults and children would be 
riding mild mannered trail horses and that, in light of the mild nature of the horses, even children as 
young as 3 years old could ride alone. Neither I nor my children had much experience riding horses, 
and we relied on the representations of the Navajo Trails guides that the horses were calm, gentle, 
and easy to control in agreeing to go on the ride. 
6. We reserved a total of 14 horses, with the 4 youngest children riding with their 
parents. 
7. All of the conversations on the day of the ride were with teenage employees ofNavajo 
Trails at the location of the stables. 
8. When we arrived at the stables at approximately 7:00 P.M., we were informed we 
needed to fill out release forms for the ride. We were told there needed to be one form filled out for 
every adult, but that each adult needed to add their children's names on the form. I filled my form 
out but did not add any names of my children. I intentionally omitted the names of my children on 
the form because I did not want the language of the release to cover any of them. Attached to this 
Affidavit as Exhibit A is a copy of the form I remember filling out with my signature on it. 
9. I turned the form with my signature back into the young men helping us, and we 
prepared for the ride. I was not questioned about the fact that none of my children were listed on the 
form. 
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10. Originally, there were three teenagers scheduled to go with us as our guides. 
However, at the last minute, there were only two guides sent with us. Each of the young men were 
16 years old. One of them rode at the front of the group and the other at the rear, with 15 horses 
being ridden by members of our group in between them. 
11. I rode with my 4 year old daughter on my horse. Another son and Jessica were on 
their own horses. 
12. After the accident, I was told by our guides that we had been taken on a new trail, one 
that the guides had not been on before. As we went along through dense wooded areas, I became 
concerned because it did not appear that our guides knew exactly where to take us. 
13. As we came up to a road and prepared to cross it, Jessica's horse, which was behind 
me with Jessica on it, suddenly bolted onto the road. Two Suburbans, traveling on the road, spooked 
Jessica's horse and she began to lose control of him. 
14. Even after Jessica's horse had been spooked by the Suburbans on the road, the guides 
had a chance to calm the horse down and maintain control of the situation. However, there was only 
one guide with us and the other was still following the rest of our group as it approached the road. 
The guide with us did not appear confident about how to deal with the situation, and while he was 
looking for help from his co-worker, Jessica's horse ran down the road with Jessica on him. 
15. Jessica's horse galloped down the road and out of our sight with Jessica holding on 
as best she could. When we caught up with Jessica several minutes later, she had been thrown from 
the horse onto the ground on her face. She had a gaping wound to her face and was going into shock. 
16. Following our attempts to deal with her injuries at the scene, Jessica was eventually 
transported to St. George, where she was treated in the emergency room for her injuries. 
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17. She was treated for a fractured nose and cheek bone, and received dozens of stitches 
to repair lacerations on her nose and cheek. 
18. She has experienced hypertrophic scarring as a result of the facial lacerations and 
continues to have significant scarring as a result of the fall and her injuries. Her medical expenses 
to date exceed $10,000.00. 
19. I am aware that Navajo Trails is claiming the right to receive indemnification from 
me for any amounts it has to pay to Jessica for her injuries. If Navajo Trails is allowed to obtain 
indemnification from me for any amounts Navajo Trails pays for Jessica's injuries, I have asked 
Jessica and her father not to pursue the lawsuit against Navajo Trails. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this 5_ day of fYlcufr , 1999. 
State of California ) 
ss: 
County of O r c x n c ? - ^ ) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on thisS^ day of f V\ £LM , 1999. 
KB3L WRIGHT I 
i Camrrman* 1124380 | 
i 
ofTWTiakn i 
Notary Pubic—Cdrfofrta 
San Diego County 
My Comm. Expire* Jan 24.2001 
•P" * *e^e^^e jP^F"e jp 
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Navajo Trails and Outfitters 
291 W 500 N 
La Verkin Utah 84745 
RELEASE FORM FOR THE RIDERS OF NAVAJO TRAILS AND OUTFITTERS 
AND SWAINS CREEK PINES LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION 
Ridin.j and handling horses can be DANGEROUS. This form must be completed and 
signed before you can ride or work for the Navajo Trails and Outfitters/ Swains 
Creek Pines Lot Owners Association. By signing this form, you agree to ASSUME 
THE RISK of any injury, death, or loss, or damage which you or your child or ward 
may sufter.^)T74^ initial if you read this. 
NanK ^ b^.i..jntknd^._.. Phone _m^2iil.. 
Last First 
Address J±..^J£ ^_C!;rr ._..!.<-/..._ 
City ' ' State Zip 
In consideration for the rendering of trail riding and or wagon riding service by 
Navajo Trails and Outfitters,/Swains Creek Pines Lot Owners Association. The 
undersigned on behalf of himself or for any person for whom he or she is a parent 
or legal gardian, does hereby indemnify (reimburse), release, and forever hold 
harmless, Navajo Trails and Outfitters,/Swains Creek Lot Owners Association, i t 's 
employees, officers, agents, patrons, students, invitees, contractors, horse owners 
and landlords acting officially or otherwise, of any claims, demands, and actions or 
causes of action on account of death or injury or loss or damage which may occur 
from any cause, without regard to negligence, other than the gross negligence or 
willful misconduct of Navajo Trails and Outfitters /Swains Creek Pines Lot Owners 
Association or such persons, during the presence of the undersigned or the 
presence of his or her child or ward at Navajo Trails and Outfitters / Swains Creek 
Pines Lot Owners Association or while the undersigned, or his or her child or ward, 
is in transit to or from Navajo Trails and Outfitters / Swains Creek Pines Lot 
Owners Association premises. If the undersigned is a parent or guardian, he or she 
further agrees to indemnify (reimburse) Navajo Trails and Outfitters and / or such 
persons for any damages paid by or assessed against Navajo Trails and Outfitters 
and / or such persons as a result of injury to or death of a child or ward. 
Date 2/iS/lL
 Signed l ^U4b«^ -
Parent or Guardian for: 
000028 
V. 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT DECISION 
OCTOBER 28,1999 
DISTRICT COURT, KANE COUNTY, UTAH 
76 North Main 
Kanab, UT 84741 
Telephone: 435-644-2458 Fax: 435-644-2052 
JESSICA HAWKINS through her guardians, 
Brain & Melinda Hawkins, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BLAIR PERT, d.b.a. NAVAJO TRAILS, 
Defendant. 
DECISION 
Case No. 980600017 
Assigned Judge DAVID L MOWER 
1. The Plaintiff is an individual and under the age of 18. 
2. Defendant is in the business of renting horses for pleasure riding. 
3. On July 18, 1997 the Plaintiff, in the company of her mother and other family members, 
visited Defendant's place of business in Kane County, Utah. 
4. Plaintiffs mother signed a document entitled "Release Form for the Riders of Navajo 
Trails and Outfitters." It contained this text: 
Riding and handling horses can be DANGEROUS.... By signing this form you 
agree to ASSUME THE RISK of any injury, death, or loss, or damage which you 
or your child ... may suffer. 
In consideration of trail riding service ... the undersigned on behalf of himself or 
for any person for whom he or she is a parent... does hereby ... release ... Navajo 
Trails and Outfitters ... of any claims ... or causes of action on account of... injury 
or loss or damage which may occur from any cause, without regard to negligence, 
H \honrc\COMMONUMOWER\990730kn wpd 
000029 
DECISION, Case number 980600017, Page -2-
other than ... gross negligence or willful misconduct .. during the presence of the 
undersigned or ... her child ... at Navajo Trails and Outfitters. 
5. Plaintiff received trail riding service from defendant. Specifically, she rode a horse 
provided by defendant; other horses and people were present, including two wranglers 
provided by defendant who lead the way. 
6. Plaintiff was injured during the trail ride. 
7. Plaintiff has filed this action against the Defendant. At least one of her causes of her 
action is based on Defendant's claimed negligence. 
Issue Presented for Decision 
The issue presented for decision here is framed by Motions for Partial Summary 
Judgment filed by both parties. The issue is: Is it against public policy in Utah to allow a parent 
to release the future causes of action of his or her child? 
Analysis 
The analysis will be divided into two parts: (1) Is the release form valid? and (2) 
assuming the answer to question 1 is "yes," is it against public policy in Utah to allow a parent 
to release the future causes of action of his or her child? 
Analysis, Part 1 
The form is a contract. The first step in analyzing any contract is to examine its language. 
If it is clear, the analysis is complete and the parties will be held to their agreement. If not, then it 
H \homc\COMMON\JMOWER\990730loi wpd 
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becomes necessary to examine surrounding facts and circumstances until the agreement is 
defined. Again, once that happens, the parties will be held to their agreement. 
Contracts which function as a release of potential liability are allowed in Utah. 
... [Pjarties may contract to avoid ... potential liability before injuries have 
occurred.... [S]uch provisions relieve one party from the risk of loss or injury in a 
particular transaction or occurrence and deprive the other party of the right to 
recover damages for loss or injury.1 
However, the release contract must be "clear and unequivocal." In Russ v. Woodside, 
quoted above, the following language taken from actual agreements was considered to meet that 
standard: 
"any claims for damages to property and injury or death" 
"any and all claims, damages, loss and expenses." 
"any death, accident, injury, or other occurrence resulting from ...." 
In this case, the release form contains this language: 
"any claims ... or causes of action on account of... injury or loss or damage which 
may occur...." 
"DANGEROUS" 
"ASSUME THE RISK" 
1
 Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc.. 276 Utah Adv. Rep. 46, 905 P.2d 901, 1995 Utah 
App. LEXIS 110 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995). 
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Many injury, death, or loss, or damage" 
These words and phrases qualify as "clear and unequivocal" because (1) they are broad 
and sweeping, and (2) they are in common usage in the English language and would be 
understood by most adults. My conclusion is that the release form was clear and unequivocal. It 
operated to avoid defendant's potential liability to Melinda Hawkins. However, the issue here is, 
"Did the release operate to avoid defendant's potential liability to Jessica, Melinda's child?" 
Analysis, Part 2 
If one were to limit the analysis only to the words in the release, the answer would be 
"yes." However, plaintiff has asked for an analysis that goes beyond the document and into the 
realm of public policy. Plaintiff has suggested that it is the public policy of this State to 
invalidate the release. 
Analysis of public policy is somewhat more difficult than analysis of contract language. 
At times it is directly stated in legislative enactments or appellate court decisions. At other times 
it must be drawn by analogy from those sources. 
The parties have suggested that there is no direct statement of public policy as to the issue 
at hand. I think their suggestion is accurate. I have located no statute or case which specifically 
refers to an parent's authority to sign a contract on a child's behalf. However, there are other 
statutes and rules relating to minors which may be helpful in the analysis. 
H \home\COMMON\JMOWER\990730kn wpd 
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I have found three statutes and one court rule which have been helpful in my analysis. 
The three statues are Sections 15-2-2, 75-5-103 and 75-5-209, Utah Code. The rule is Rule 17, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. I will quote the relevant text and then refer to each as the analysis 
continues, below. 
15-2-2. Liability for necessaries and on contracts - Disaffirmance. 
A minor is bound ... by his contracts, unless he disaffirms them before or within a 
reasonable time after he attains his majority .... 
75-5-103. Delegation of powers by parent or guardian. 
A parent or a guardian of a minor ... may delegate to another ... any of his powers 
regarding care, custody, or property of the minor ... except his power to consent to 
marriage or adoption.... 
75-5-209. Powers and duties of guardian of minor. 
A guardian of a minor has the powers and responsibilities of a parent.... In 
particular, and without qualifying the foregoing, a guardian has the following 
powers and duties: 
(1) He must take reasonable care of his ward's personal effects and commence 
protective proceedings if necessary to protect other property of the ward. 
(2) .... 
(3) The guardian is empowered to facilitate the ward's education, social, or 
other activities and to authorize medical or other professional care, 
treatment, or advice. A guardian is not liable by reason of this consent for 
injury to the ward resulting from the negligence or acts of third persons 
unless it would have been illegal for a parent to have consented 
Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant. 
(b).. . . A minor ... who is a party must appear either by a general guardian or by a 
guardian ad litem .... A guardian ad litem may be appointed in any case when it is 
H \home\COMMON\JMOWER\990730kn wpd 
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deemed by the court in which the action or proceeding is prosecuted expedient to 
represent the minor... notwithstanding that the person may have a general 
guardian and may have appeared by the guardian. 
Section 15-2-2 refers to a child's ability to disaffirm a contract. If a child can disaffirm a 
contract, it seems only logical to infer that a child has the capacity to enter into a contract in the 
first place. 
Had I been in the defendant's shoes on July 18, 1997,1 would not have been inclined to 
ask Jessica to sign the release form. I would have said to myself, "Hey, watch out. She's a minor. 
If she signs, it won't be worth the paper its written on because she can disaffirm it within a 
reasonable time after her eighteenth birthday. You'd better have a parent sign for her." I would 
then have turned to Melinda and asked her to sign the release. 
Now I imagine myself to be in Melinda's shoes. These thoughts go through my mind as I 
read the release form and consider whether or not to sign it. "You know, the Legislature has 
never defined my powers as a parent except to say that I can delegate any of them regarding care, 
custody, or property to a guardian (Section 75-5-103, Utah Code). 
"The Legislature has defined a guardian's powers. It is logical for me to infer that the 
guardian's powers would be the same as mine, since I had the right to delegate them in the first 
place. So, I'm responsible to take care of Jessica's personal effects and to protect any of her other 
property. I'm also responsible to facilitate Jessica's education, social, or other activities (Section 
H \homc\COMMON\JMOWER\990730kn wpd 
DECISION, Case number 980600017, Page -7-
75-5-209)." 
Now, standing in Melinda's shoes, I would have felt the stress of a dilemma. On the one 
hand I would have said to myself, "You are Jessica's parent. You are responsible to facilitate her 
social activities. Well, this is a social activity, horse-back riding with the family. Encourage her 
to participate. Sign the release form." 
On the other hand I would have also said to myself, "You know, Jessica could be injured, 
perhaps by defendant's fault. If I sign away her claim to recover (i.e., her property, her "chose in 
action"2), she may be injured permanently. I'm supposed to protect her property, not give it 
away. Don't sign that release form. 
"If I were to ask the Legislature or the Supreme Court, I wonder what advice I would be 
given? Should I sign the form or not? Is it more important for me to protect Jessica's property or 
to facilitate her social activities?" 
My prediction is that the Legislature would say, "We have not attempted to prioritize or 
rank any of a parent's duties or powers. They're all of equal importance." 
The only possible reaction to that advice from the Legislature would be to adopt the 
conservative approach and not sign the release. 
2
 The term "chose in action" is comprehensive; it includes the infinite variety of 
contracts, covenants, and promises which confer on one party the right to recover 
a personal chattel or a sum of money from another by action. 63 C Am Jur 2d 
Property §23 
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Plaintiff has suggested that another answer to the dilemma has been given in a decision of 
the state of Washington3: "...[T]o the extent a parent's release of a third party's liability for 
negligence purports to bar a child's own cause of action, it violates public policy and is 
unenforceable." 
DECISION 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment ought to be denied. This Court will follow the 
decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington because children have special, 
protected status in Utah as reflected by various legislative pronouncements. To the extent 
Melinda's release purports to bar Jessica's cause of action, it violates public policy and is 
unenforceable. 
Mr. King is appointed to draft an appropriate order and to submit it for execution by 
following the procedure set forth in Rule 4-504, Code of Judicial Administration^—-~^ 
Signed on October 2 ^ 1999 J ^ f 4 ^ / fy^r?\* 
D A W L MOWER if / # ^ % v \
 n 
DISTRICT JUDGE '* ! ^ '—x M * « 
vtc 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ^ **' -. ""--*' ° 
On October <~& , 1999 a copy of the above DECISION was sent to each of the 
3
 Justin Scott, et al. Appellants, v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, et al 
Respondents 119 Wash. 2d 484, 834 P.2d 6 (Washington Supreme Court, 1992) 
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following by the method indicated: 
Addressee Method (M=mail, P=in person, F=Fax) Addressee Method (M=mail, P=in person, F=Fax) 
James W. Jensen 
Attorney for Defendant 
PO Box 726 
Cedar City UT 84720 
[ m] Brian S. King 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 825 
4 Traid Center 
Salt Lake City UT 84180 
[m] 
X U ^ L ^ Uu^A.^J 
^ 
H \home\COMMON\JMOWER\990730kn wpd 
000037 
VI. 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
MARCH 31, 2000 
JAMES W. JENSEN (6578) 
HIGBEE, JENSEN & MACFARLANE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
250 South Main 
PO BOX 726 
Cedar City, UT 84721 
Telephone: (435)586-4404 
FAX: (435) 586-1002 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JESSICA HAWKINS through 
her guardians, Brian and Melinda Hawkins, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BLAIR PEART, dba NAVAJO TRAILS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 0980600017 
Judge David L. Mower 
This matter came before the court on June 25, 1999 for hearing on Motions for Summary 
Judgment filed by Plaintiff, Jessica Hawkins through her guardians, Brian and Melinda Hawkins, 
and Defendant Blair Peart, dba Navajo Trails. Brian S. King appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs. 
James W. Jensen appeared on behalf of said Defendant. Both parties present argument. The 
Court having heard the argument, and being fully advised in the premises; now therefore entered 
its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff is an individual and under the age of 18. 
2. Defendant is in the business of renting horses for pleasure riding. 
000038 
3. On July 18, 1997, the Plaintiff, in the company of her mother and other family 
members, visited Defendant's place of business in Kane County, Utah. 
4. Plaintiffs mother signed a document entitled "Release Form for the Riders of Navajo 
Trails and Outfitters." It contained this text: 
Riding and handling horses can be DANGEROUS, . . By signing this 
form you agree to ASSUME THE RISK of any injury, death, or loss, or 
damage which you or your child . . . may suffer. 
In consideration . . . of trail riding . . . service . . .[t]he undersigned on 
behalf of himself or for any person for whom he or she is a parent . . . 
does hereby indemnify (reimburse), release and forever hold harmless, 
Navajo Trails and Outfitters . . . of any claims . . . or causes of action on 
account of . . . injury or loss or damage which may occur from any 
cause, without regard to negligence, other than . . . gross negligence or 
willful misconduct. . . during the presence of the undersigned or . . . her 
child. . . at Navajo Trails and Outfitters. If the undersigned is a parent 
. . . he or she further agrees to indemnify (reimburse) Navajo Trails . . 
. for any damages paid by or assessed against Navajo Trails . . . as a 
result of injury . . . of a child. 
5. Plaintiff received trail riding service from Defendant. Specifically, she road a horse 
provided by Defendant; other horses and people were present, including two wranglers provided 
by Defendant who lead the way. 
6. Plaintiff was injured during the trail ride. 
7. Plaintiff has filed this action against the Defendant, with at least one of her causes of 
action based on Defendant's alleged negligence. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The language of the Release Form, including "any claims . . . or causes of action on 
account of. . . injury or los or damage which may occur. . .", "DANGEROUS"; "ASSUME THE 
RISK"; "any injury, death, or loss, or damage"; is "clear and unequivocal" pursuant to the 
2
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following language in Russ. v. Woodside: 
(1) "any claims for damages to property and injury or death"; (2) "any and 
all claims, damages and expenses"; and (3) "any death, accident, injury, 
or other occurrence resulting from 
2. The words and phrases used in the Release Form qualify as "clear and unequivocal' 
because they are broad and sweeping, and they are in common usage in the English language and 
would be understood by most adults. 
3. The Release Form operated to avoid Defendant's potential liability to Melinda Hawkins 
for her minor child, Jessica Hawkins. 
4. The indemnification language, including "indemnify (reimburse)" and "for any 
damages. . . as a result of injury. . . or a child", is clear and unequivocal. 
5. The indemnification language is clear and unequivocal because it is broad and sweeping 
and is in common usage in the English language and would be understood by most adults. 
6. The Release Form operated to require Plaintiff to reimburse Defendant for any damages 
assessed against Defendant as a result of the injury to Jessica Hawkins. 
7. There are no Utah statutes or controlling case law which specifically address the issue 
of whether it is against public policy for a parent to sign a contract on a child's behalf, releasing 
the child's possible future claims or causes of action. 
8. There are other statutes and rules relating to minors which are helpful in the analysis 
of whether such is against public policy, including the following: 
(a) Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-2. Liability for necessaries and on contracts 
Disaffirmance. 
3
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A minor is bound. . . by his contracts, unless he disaffirms them before 
or within a reasonable time after he attains his majority . . . 
(b) Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-103. Delegation of powers by parent or guardian. 
A parent or a guardian of a minor . . . may delegate to another . . . any 
of his powers regarding care, custody, or property of the minor . . . 
except his power to consent to marriage or adoption . . . 
(c) Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-209. Powers atnd duties of guardian of minor. 
A guardian of a minor has the powers and responsibilities of a parent. . . 
In particular, and without qualifying the foregoing, a guardian has the 
following powers and duties: 
(1) He must take reasonable care of his ward's personal effects and 
commence protective proceedings if necessary to protect other 
Property of the ward. 
(2) . . . 
(3) The guardian is empowered to facilitate the ward's education, 
social, or other activities and to authorize medical or other 
professional care, treatment, or advice. A guardian is not liable 
by reason of this consent for injury to the ward resulting from 
the negligence or acts of third persons unless it would have been 
illegal for a parent to have consented. . . 
(d) Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Parties Plaintiff and 
Defendant. 
(b) . . . A minor . . . who is a party must appear either by a general 
guardian or by a guardian ad litem . . . A guardian ad litem may be 
appointed in any case when it is deemed by the court in which the action 
or proceeding is prosecuted expedient to represent the minor . . . 
notwithstanding that the person may have a general guardian and may 
have appeared by the guardian. 
9. The Court concludes that public policy weighs in favor of Plaintiff on the issue of 
shifting liability because a parent should protect a minor's property and not give it away. 
4
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10. \ . .[T]o the extent a parent's release of a third party's liability for negligence purports 
to bar a child's own cause of action, it violates public policy and is unenforceable," as stated by 
the Washington Supreme Court. 
DATED this J} day of > K > K A , 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
k 
DAVID L. MOWER 
District Court Judge 
5 
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VII. 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ORDER 
MARCH 31, 2000 
JAMES W. JENSEN (6578) 
fflGBEE, JENSEN & MACFARLANE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
250 South Main 
PO BOX 726 
Cedar City, UT 84721 
Telephone: (435)586-4404 
FAX: (435) 586-1002 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JESSICA HAWKINS through 
her guardians, Brian and Melinda Hawkins, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BLAIR PEART, dba NAVAJO TRAILS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 0980600017 
Judge David L. Mower 
Based upon the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the parties, and based upon the 
Court's Decision dated October 28, 1999 and based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied in 
part as to the issue of the release and granted in part as to the issue of the indemnification, and 
as a result, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is moot. 
DATED this ?( day of K**"^A , 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
_ V £ l 
DAVID L. MOWER 
VIII. 
SIXTH JUDICIAL COURT ORDER 
MAY 26, 2000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JESSICA HAWKINS through 
her guardians, Brian and 
Melinda Hawkins, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BLAIR PEART, dba 
NAVAJO TRAILS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 980600017 
^ 
Judge David L. Mower 
'/n-: 
°°u£** 
The parties appeared before the Court on March 31,2000, for a hearing to clarify this Court's 
October 28,1999, decision and to determine which party's proposed document to sign. On that date 
and after hearing further argument on the indemnification issue, the Court entered Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, together with an Order that had been prepared by Defendant's counsel. 
Plaintiff desires to appeal aspects of the Order that was entered March 31, 2000, which has 
necessitated Defendant's desire to appeal other aspects of said Order. However, the Order entered 
by the Court on that day does not dispose of all the claims between the parties. As such, both parties 
request that the Court enter a final judgment, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) that 
will allow for immediate appeal. 
Having considered that matter and being fully apprised in the premises, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that there is no just reason for delay of entry of final judgment as to the issues involved 
in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, entered by the Court on March 31, 2000, 
Hi )n\\AA 
and the Court expressly directs entry of this judgment in a form which is a final, appealable Order 
under URCivP 54(b). 
DATED this _ day of , 2000. 
Approved as to form: 
Brian S. King 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
JagSes W. Jensen,, 
Attorney for Defendant 
Stxth^Judicial District Court 
Judge Da\id L. Mower 
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IX. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
BrianS. King (#4610) 
Marcie E. Schaap (#4660) 
KING & ISAACSON, P.C. 
4 Triad Center, Suite 825 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Telephone: (801) 532-1700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JESSICA HAWKINS through 
her guardians, Brian and 
Melinda Hawkins, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BLAIR PEART, dba 
NAVAJO TRAILS, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, by their counsel, Brian S. King of King & Isaacson, P.C, hereby 
give notice of their appeal from the Order, entered in the above referenced case in the Sixth 
Judicial District Court of Kane County on May 26, 2000. This appeal is taken to the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
With this Notice of Appeal, Plaintiffs/Appellants tender the filing fee, docketing fee, and 
cost bond, required under Rules 3 and 6 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 980600017 
Judge David L. Mower 
1 
DATED the Q_ day of June, 2000. 
KING & [SAACSON, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
/*_ ' s 
By: Brian S. King 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the ilday of June, 2000,1 mailed a copy of the foregoing Notice of 
Appeal, first class mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
James W. Jensen 
HIGBEE & JENSEN, P.C. 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
^idL^foMYtor 
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